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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
This is an appeal from a final partial summary judgment 
of the Third District Court evicting defendant/appellant 
(hereinafter referred to as "Wasatch") from leased premises. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/respondent ("Olympus") objects to Wasatch's 
statement of issues on appeal for the reasons stated more fully 
below. Many of the issues presented by Wasatch are not properly 
before this court. The only issues on appeal are (1) whether Judge 
Wilkinson properly granted Olympus's motion for partial summary 
judgment (2) properly found that there was no just reason for delay 
and (3) properly certified that judgment as a final judgment. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
Olympus believes to be determinative, is copied and attached hereto 
as Exhibit "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a partial summary judgment 
evicting Wasatch from leased premises. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On or about September 10, 1984, Olympus and Wasatch 
entered into a written lease agreement (R. 6-48) under which 
Wasatch agreed to lease from Olympus certain real property in the 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center located at 4015 South Wasatch 
Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah. Wasatch failed to make lease 
payments under the lease, and on or about October 12, 1987, Wasatch 
executed a promissory note agreement in the amount of $67,197.68, 
which amount constituted the delinquent amount due under said 
lease. R. 194-196. A copy of said promissory note is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B". 
On or about December 22, 1987, Wasatch was again 
delinquent and Olympus filed an unlawful detainer action (original 
complaint in this action). R. 2-49. Wasatch answered the 
complaint and settlement negotiations followed. On June 20, 1988, 
the parties executed a letter agreement (Exhibit "C"). The 
validity of the letter agreement is questionable since the parties 
were never able to agree whether the percentage rent in paragraph 
1 was monthly or annual. The agreement shows the word being 
changed several times, but no final agreement was reached as to 
that wording. 
Regardless of the wording, the terms of the letter 
agreement were never followed by Wasatch. Thus, Olympus moved to 
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amend its complaint (R. 87-92) and the court granted Olympus's 
motion to amend on January 6, 1989. R. 95-96. On or about January 
29, 19 89, Olympus moved for partial summary judgment to evict 
Wasatch. R. 104-112. Olympus's motion was supported by an 
affidavit stating that Wasatch was in default in payments due under 
the lease agreement in the amount of $140,000.00. R. 110-112 and 
Exhibit "G". Wasatch filed no opposing affidavit, and opposed the 
motion on legal grounds only. R. 113-117. 
On April 28, 1989, the court granted Olympus's motion to 
evict. R. 151-152. On June 1, 1989, a Writ of Restitution was 
executed and Wasatch was thereafter removed from the subject 
premises. R. 184-185, 188. On June 7, 1989, the parties appeared 
before Judge Daniels (due to Judge Wilkinson's absence) regarding 
the question of whether Wasatch's bond would retroactively stay 
execution of the already executed writ of restitution. Judge 
Daniels made an order, which was signed on June 15, 1989, wherein 
he ruled that, for the convenience of the parties, pending Judge 
Wilkinson's return, Wasatch would be allowed to return to the 
premises but without prejudice to Olympus's execution of the writ 
of restitution. R. 205-208. 
Upon Judge Wilkinson's return, at least two hearings were 
held regarding the sufficiency of Wasatch's supersedeas bond. 
Wasatch never did comply with Judge Wilkinson's orders regarding 
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the supersedeas bond. Judge Wilkinson had given defendant until 
June 27, 1989 to comply with the court's orders regarding the 
supersedeas bond. Rather than filing the bond, Wasatch filed 
bankruptcy on June 27, 1989. R. 258. However, on June 28, 1989, 
Judge Clark entered an order lifting the stay. R. 253-254 and 
Exhibit "D". A second writ of restitution was executed June 29, 
1989, and Wasatch was removed from the subject premises a second 
time. R. 251-252. 
On July 3, 19 89, the bankruptcy stay was reinstated nunc 
pro tunc by Judge Boulden and Wasatch was once again allowed to 
return to the premises. On August 8, 1989, the stay was again 
lifted by Judge Clark (Exhibit "E" ) and a third writ of restitution 
was executed on August 8, 1989 (R. 271-275), removing Wasatch from 
the premises. On August 16, 1989, Wasatch's bankruptcy was 
dismissed. Exhibit "F". 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On April 28, 1989, Judge Wilkinson entered an order of 
partial summary judgment evicting Wasatch from its leased premises 
based upon its default under the lease agreement. Judge Wilkinson 
reserved for a later ruling the question of the amount of the 
default. However, Judge Wilkinson found that there was no just 
reason for delay of execution of the eviction order and directed 
a final judgment. 
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RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
The only facts upon which Judge Wilkinson based his 
ruling are found in the Affidavit of Lauren B. Hunt. Wasatch never 
did file a counteraffidavit contesting any of the facts set forth 
in the Affidavit of Lauren B. Hunt. A copy of Ms. Hunt's affidavit 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "G" for the court's convenience. The 
sworn testimony is that, as of January 1, 1988, Wasatch was 
substantially past due in rental payments due under the lease 
agreement, the payments were never brought current, and the default 
amount totals, as of January 20, 1989, $147,250.79. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wasatch has no basis whatsoever for this appeal. First 
of all, this is not an unlawful detainer action, but is an action 
for breach of lease agreement, requesting eviction, past due rent 
and attorney's fees. The complaint was amended and the original 
unlawful detainer complaint is not an issue. 
Second, the issue of eviction and the amount of the 
default are distinct and separable requests for relief. Because 
Wasatch has admitted through all stages of this action that it was 
in substantial default, there was no just reason to delay the 
eviction pending the determination of the amount due. 
9 
Finally, the court below never approved Wasatch's 
supersedeas bond because it was an insufficient surety. Therefore, 
there never was a stay of the execution of the judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED OLYMPUS'S MOTION TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT. 
On or about December 22, 1987, Olympus filed its 
complaint against Wasatch for unlawful detainer, alleging default 
of payment of rent and seeking to evict Wasatch. For the next 
several months, the parties attempted to negotiate a settlement 
which culminated in the letter agreement of June 20, 1988, which 
was signed July 13, 1988. However, that agreement was never 
properly executed since the parties could not agree as to whether 
the percentage rent in paragraph 1 was annual or monthly. 
At any rate, even if the agreement was properly executed, 
it was immediately breached by Wasatch. Therefore, as of December 
20, 1988, Wasatch was in substantial breach of the original lease, 
with or without the amendment. On that date, Olympus filed its 
motion to amend complaint. 
The amended complaint sought the same remedy as the 
original complaint eviction of Wasatch based upon a default 
in the payment of rent. The amended complaint brought the letter 
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agreement into issue and sought eviction on the basis of breach of 
lease rather than unlawful detainer. 
Amending the complaint was the obvious and proper 
procedure for Olympus to follow. All of the issues raised in the 
original complaint were as yet unresolved, namely, eviction, amount 
of rent due, and payment of penalties, costs and attorney's fees. 
When the parties could not reach a settlement and when Wasatch 
continued to fail to make the payments due, then Olympus had to 
again seek its remedy. A new action would have been improper since 
Olympus was seeking the same relief as in the original action. 
At any rate, the court's order allowing Olympus to amend 
its complaint certainly caused no prejudice to Wasatch in that no 
trial date had ever been scheduled. The motion was timely for the 
same reason and due to the fact that the parties had in good faith 
attempted to negotiate a settlement during the one year period that 
the case was pending before the amendment. Therefore, under the 
recent Court of Appeals case of Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. 
Reichert, 122 Utah Adv.Rep. 46, 50 (Ct.App. 11-24-89), all of the 
factors for the granting of a motion to amend were met. 
Many of the arguments in Wasatch's brief focus on the 
fact that the original complaint was an unlawful detainer 
complaint. However, it is very clear under Utah law that the 
original complaint is no longer an issue in this case for any 
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purpose. In the case of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and 
Helpers, Local Union 222 v. Motor Cargo, 530 P.2d 807 (Utah 1974) 
the court stated: 
The law is overwhelming to the effect that when 
an amended complaint, complete in and of 
itself, is filed, the former complaint is 
functus officio and cannot be used for any 
purpose. 
Id. at 808. 
In this case, an amended complaint was filed and was 
complete in and of itself. Therefore, the original complaint 
"cannot be used for any purpose." 
Furthermore, in the case of Munden v. Hazelrigg, 105 
Wash.2d. 39, 711 P.2d 295 (1985), the Supreme Court of Washington 
held that a complaint originally filed as an unlawful detainer 
action could be converted to an ordinary civil action. The court 
stated: 
Additionally, conversion of an unlawful 
detainer action to a civil suit spares the 
expense and inconvenience to all parties of 
maintaining two suits. . . 
We also note that the trial court has inherent 
power to fashion the method by which an 
unlawful detainer action is converted to an 
ordinary civil action. The court may require 
amended pleadings to convert the unlawful 
detainer to a civil suit. 
Id. at 299. 
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Likewise in the case of Thomson v. Reynolds, 174 P. 164 
(Utah 1918), the Utah Supreme Court directed that an unlawful 
detainer action be remanded and that the District Court permit the 
parties to amend and recast their pleadings. Id., at 167. 
Therefore, Olympus's original complaint was properly 
amended to a civil action. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR EVICTION. 
Olympus has already discussed above the issue of the 
letter agreement. Whether or not it was properly executed, both 
it and the original lease agreement were in default at all times 
relevant to this proceeding. Furthermore, whether or not the 
letter agreement was properly executed, all of the provisions of 
the main lease agreement continued in effect except those 
specifically changed in the letter agreement. Contrary to the 
allegations of Wasatch in its brief, the letter agreement does not 
state that there is no forfeiture clause. The letter agreement 
merely states that the reduced payments will continue for two 
years, at the end of which time the regular lease payments will 
resume. 
Section 24.01 of the lease agreement provides: 
In the event of any failure of tenant to pay 
any rental due hereunder within ten (10) days 
after the same shall be due, . . . then owner 
besides other rights and remedies it may have, 
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shall have the immediate right of re-entry and 
may remove all persons and property from the 
leased premises and such property may be 
removed and stored in a public warehouse at the 
cost of, and for the account of tenant, all 
without service of notice or resort to legal 
process and without being guilty of trespass 
or becoming liable for any loss or damage which 
may be occasioned thereby. 
Section 24.02 provides: 
Should owner elect to re-enter, as herein 
provided, or should it take possession pursuant 
to legal proceedings or pursuant to any notice 
provided for by law, it may either terminate 
this lease or it may from time to time without 
terminating this lease . . . relet said 
premises . . . 
In response to Olympus's motion for summary judgment, 
Judge Wilkinson terminated the lease and ordered a writ of 
restitution, restoring Olympus to possession of the leased premises 
and evicting Wasatch. In addition, Judge Clark has found in a 
final order, from which no appeal was ever taken, that the lease 
was forfeited. See Exhibit "E". 
Therefore, Wasatch's several claims that there was no 
forfeiture provision or any other remedy available to Olympus Hills 
for restitution of the premises fails. Judge Wilkinson properly 
evicted Wasatch for failure to pay rent. 
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III. WASATCH'S ALLEGATION THAT RENT PAYMENTS FOR APRIL 
AND MAY OF 1989 WERE MADE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT; AT ANY 
RATE, OLYMPUS DENIES THAT SUCH PAYMENTS WERE MADE. 
Wasatch alleges in Section 7 of its brief that Olympus 
accepted rent and waived its right to restitution. These factual 
allegations are not in the record before this court and were never 
made a part of the ruling below from which the appeal was taken. 
Furthermore, Olympus denies having ever received payment 
of rent for April and May of 1989. Wasatch did promise that it 
would bring all rent payments current soon after the court's order 
in April of 1989. Wasatch occasionally made payments toward old 
obligations to Olympus. However, Wasatch never became current in 
its lease payments. Although Wasatch makes that allegation in its 
brief, it was never made in the court below and is not properly 
before this court. 
IV. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPERLY CERTIFIED 
AS A FINAL ORDER. 
Wasatch contends that the trial court improperly 
certified the partial summary judgment motion for eviction as a 
final judgment. Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to 
fewer than all the claims "where more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action . . . " Rule 54(b). In this case, there are 
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three claims for relief. The prayer in Olympus's amended complaint 
reads: 
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant 
as follows: 
1. For the issuance of a writ of restitution to 
restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff and 
to evict the defendant. 
2. For past due rent and other charges accruing 
under the lease as amended in the total amount of 
$140,990.54. 
3. For reasonable attorney's fees. 
4. For such other damages as may be allowed under 
the lease agreement as amended or under law as may be 
more specifically proved at the time of trial hereon or 
at a later date. 
5. For costs of suit incurred herein, interest and 
such other further relief as the court may deem proper. 
Therefore, this is clearly a case "where more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action". 
The court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
fewer than all the claims when it expressly determines that "there 
is no just reason for delay." Rule 54(b). The court made that 
express determination in this case, obviously for several reasons. 
Wasatch did not dispute that it was in substantial default. There 
was no reason to allow Wasatch to remain on the premises, 
essentially rent free, while Wasatch forced the parties to go to 
trial over the issues of the amount due, when payments were made, 
whether payments were intended to be applied to the promissory note 
16 
or to the lease, whether bad checks had been paid back, etc. All 
of those issues were reserved for a later trial. 
In the meantime, Wasatch offered no reason whatsoever why 
there was a just reason for delay. Even on appeal, Wasatch has 
offered no just reason why Olympus should have been forced to have 
Wasatch occupy the premises rent free, after a finding by the court 
that Wasatch was in substantial default. No finding at trial over 
the amount due ever could have had an impact on the distinct and 
separate finding by the court that Olympus was entitled to recover 
possession. That was a distinct, separate claim for relief. 
In the case of Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 692 P.2d 
765 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court quoted from the United 
States Supreme Court as follows: 
But the District Court may, by the exercise of its 
discretion in the interest of sound judicial 
administration, release for appeal final decisions upon 
one or more, but less than all, claims in multiple claims 
actions. The timing of such a release is, with good 
reason, vested by the rule primarily in the discretion 
of the District Court as the one most likely to be 
familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons 
for delay. [Emphasis in original]. 
Id. at 768. 
Furthermore, in the case of Allen Steel Company v. 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, 119 Utah Adv.Rep. 6 (Sup.Ct. 10-6-
89), the Utah Supreme Court held that a claim for attorney's fees 
is uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at 
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trial and that a final judgment can be awarded, with the question 
of the attorney's fees award reserved for a later hearing. Ld. at 
9-10. 
Therefore, the trial court, in its discretion, properly 
certified the judgment as to possession as a final judgment, 
subject to immediate execution, since there was no just reason for 
delay of execution of that judgment. If this court determines 
that, due to the remaining claims for rent and attorneys fees, the 
eviction judgment was not a final judgment for the purpose of 
executing the judgment, Olympus is willing to waive its claim to 
the rent due. That would necessarily result in a final judgment. 
However, Olympus will not waive that claim under any other 
circumstances. 
V. WASATCH FAILED TO POST A SUFFICIENT SUPERSEDEAS BOND. 
In at least two hearings, Wasatch failed to satisfy the 
court's order regarding the posting of a supersedeas bond. Rule 
62(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an 
appellant may file a supersedeas bond to obtain a stay. However, 
that rule further provides: "The stay is effective when the 
supersedeas bond is approved by the court." 
In this case, the court never did approve the sufficiency 
of the proposed bond. When Wasatch proposed to pledge the assets 
of its sister company, Rancho Lanes, as security for Olympus's 
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judgment in this action, and when Olympus objected to that bond 
under Rule 62(i) as simply posting one financially troubled bowling 
alley for another, both Judge Daniels and Judge Wilkinson required 
a second surety in order to offer sufficient protection to Olympus. 
Wasatch failed to ever post a second sufficient surety. The trial 
court gave Wasatch more than sufficient time and opportunity to 
post such a bond, but Wasatch was either unable or unwilling to do 
so. 
Therefore, the trial court properly ruled that there was 
not sufficient surety for a supersedeas bond. 
VI. THE ISSUES RAISED IN WASATCH'S APPEAL HAVE BECOME 
MOOT: THE LEASE HAS ALREADY BEEN DECLARED TERMINATED. 
On August 8, 19 89, Judge Glen E. Clark of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah entered an order 
granting Olympus relief from the automatic stay, allowing Olympus 
to pursue its state law remedies with respect to the premises which 
are the subject matter of this action. In that order, the court 
found: 
The prepetition eviction of the debtor [Wasatch] pursuant 
to the Writ of Restitution terminated the lease, leaving 
nothing for the debtor to assume or assign on the 
petition date. 
Wasatch never appealed this order of the Bankruptcy Court 
finding a termination of the lease agreement. Therefore, Wasatch 
cannot now dispute the fact that the lease has been terminated. 
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Accordingly, Wasatch has no rights whatsoever in the subject 
premises. Even if the court were to reverse the decision of the 
trial court, Wasatch would be unable to return to possession of 
the premises, it having no interest in the premises. Further, once 
Judge Clark determined that the lease had been terminated, Olympus 
leased the premises to a new tenant, who now has possession of the 
premises under a new leasehold agreement. 
VII. OLYMPUS IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
IN THIS APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Rules 33(a) and 40(a) of the Rules of this 
court, and under the case of O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P. 2d 306 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1987), attorney's fees can be awarded if an appeal has no 
basis in law or fact. In this case, the lease has been forfeited, 
and Wasatch has admitted from the very beginning that it was in 
substantial default under the lease agreement. Pursuant to the 
terms of the lease agreement, Olympus is entitled to recover 
possession of the premises upon Wasatch's default. Having admitted 
being in default under the terms of the lease, Wasatch has no 
position to complain about being evicted, either in the trial court 
or on appeal. This appeal has no valid basis in law or in fact, 
and is brought solely for the purpose of harassing Olympus. 
This appeal culminates Wasatch's long series of delay 
tactics, made up of breached agreements, an overdue promissory 
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note, bad checks, frivolous opposition to Olympus's eviction 
action, improper supersedeas bonds and an eleventh hour bankruptcy. 
All of these tactics forced Olympus to evict Wasatch three separate 
times. These circumstances, followed by this meritless appeal, 
certainly entitle Olympus to an award of its attorneys fees. The 
history of the case is similar to Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), where fees were awarded as a result of 
successive petitions to modify the divorce decree. 
Therefore, Olympus is entitled to recover its attorney's 
fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed and Olympus should be awarded its attorney's fees incurred 
in responding to this appeal. 
DATED this 1 / day of January, 1990. 
KESLER & RUST 
SC0'TO? 0 . MERCER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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Exhibits 
Exhibit A 
477 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 54 
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence 
for a court sitting without a jury, 
(d) Proceedings. 
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the 
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a 
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt 
thereof unless the order of reference otherwise 
provides, the. master shall forthwith set a time 
and place for the first meeting of the parties or 
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after 
the date of the order of reference and shall notify 
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the 
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence. 
Either party, on notice to the parties and master, 
may apply to the court for an order requiring the 
master to speed the proceedings and to make his 
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and 
place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte 
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a 
future day, giving notice to the absent party of 
the adjournment. 
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the 
attendance of witnesses before the master by the 
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in 
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness 
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be pun-
ished as for a contempt and be subjected to the 
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided 
in Rules 37 and 45. 
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of 
accounting are in issue before the master, he 
may prescribe the form in which the accounts 
shall be submitted and in any proper case may 
require or receive in evidence a statement by a 
certified public accountant who is called as a wit-
ness. Upon objection of a party to any of the 
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the 
form of statement is insufficient, the master may 
require a different form of statement to be fur-
nished, or the accounts or specific items thereof 
to be proved by oral examination of the account-
ing parties or upon written interrogatories or in 
such other manner as he directs. 
i) Report 
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall 
prepare a report upon the matters submitted to 
him by the order of reference and, if required to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he 
shall set them forth in the report. He shall file 
the report with the clerk of the court and in an 
action to be tried without a jury, unless other-
wise directed by the order of reference, shall file 
with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the 
evidence and the original exhibits. The clerk 
shall forthwith mail to all parties notice of the 
filing. 
(2) fn non-jury actions. In an action to be 
tried without a jury the court shall accept the 
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. 
Within 10 days after being served with notice of 
the filing of the report any party may serve writ-
ten objections thereto upon the other parties. Ap-
plication to the court for action upon the report 
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion 
and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The 
court after hearing may adopt the report or may 
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or 
may receive further evidence or may recommit it 
with instructions. 
(3) In jury actions. In an action to be tried by 
a jury the master shall not be directed to report 
the evidence. His findings upon the issues sub-
mitted to him are admissible as evidence of the 
matters found and may be read to the jury, sub-
ject to the ruling of the court upon any objections 
in point of law which may be made to the report. 
(4) Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a 
master's report is the same whether or not the 
parties have consented to the reference; but, 
when the parties stipulate that a master's find-
ings of fact shall be final, only questions of law 
arising upon the report shall thereafter be con-
sidered. 
(5) Draft report Before filing his report a 
master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for 
all parties for the purpose of receiving their sug-
gestions. 
(0 Objections to appointment of master. A 
party may object to the appointment of any person as 
a master on the same grounds as a party may chal-
lenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial 
of a civil action. Such objections must be heard and 
disposed of by the court in the same manner as a 
motion. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
PART VH. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these 
rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of 
prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or in-
volving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and lia-
bilities of fewer than all the parties shall not termi-
nate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is subject to revi-
sion at any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when 
the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as be-
tween or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by de-
fault shall not be different in kind from, or ex-
ceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute of 
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed 
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PROMISSORY NOTE AGREEMENT 
WHERKAS, on September 10, 1984, Wasatch Bowling, Inc., 
entered into a certain lease agreement with Olympus Hills 
Shopping Center, Ltd., owner, under which Wasatch Bowling as 
tenant, agreed to lease from OLympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., 
approximately 22,000 square feet of real property in the Olympus 
Hills Shopping Center located at 4015 South Wasatch Boulevard, 
Salt Lake City, Utah; and 
WHEREAS, Wasatch Bowling, Inc., is substantially in default 
in the payment of payments due, including rent, under the terms 
and conditions of said lease agreement; and 
WHEREAS, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., has certain 
rights and remedies against Wasatch Bowling, including, but net 
limited to, legal action to evict Wasatch Bowling and/or for all 
amounts due and all attorney's fees and costs; and 
WHEREAS, Wasatch Bowling, Inc. contemplates certain 
refinancing arrangements for its business operations and agrees 
and warrants it will use its best efforts and all due diligence 
to complete such refinancing and upon the successful completion 
of the same, will immediately pay the obligation represented 
hereby in full, notwithstanding any other terms and conditions 
herein; and 
WHEREAS, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., is willing to 
forebear its rights to proceed immediately against Wasatch 
Bowling, Inc., upon certain terms and conditions and if and only 
if the obligations contained herein are guaranteed personally by 
Wesley F. Sine; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of such forebearance and 
other good and valuable consideration receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, Wasatch Bowling, Inc., promises to pay to Olympus 
Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., at Salt Lake City, Utah, or at such 
other place as the holder hereof shall designate in writing the 
sum of Sixty-Nine Thousand Four Hundred and Eighty-Three Dollars 
and no/lOOths ($69,483.00) in 24 successive monthly installments of 
$1,200.00 each due on the same day of each month, commencing 
October J, 1987, and continuing for a period of 23 months and 
one final payment of the full unpaid balance remaining due 
hereunder, which payment shall be due within thirty days of the 
due date of the last monthly installment hereinabove set forth. 
Wasatch Bowling shall also pay the Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center, Ltd. with the first installment due October 1, 1987, ar\ 
additional sum equal to the legal fees and costs incurred by 
Olympus Hills in the preparation and execution of this Promissory 
Note Agreement and the Guarantees incident thereto. Olympus 
Hills shaLl notify Wasatch Bowling the amount of such additional 
payment due, at lease five (5) days prior to October 1, 1987. 
Wasatch Bowling shall provide to Olympus Hills a current 
financial statement at the time of executing this agreement and 
at the end of every nine (9) month period in the event payment is 
not made as agreed or this agreement is extended or renewed. 
This obligation shall bear interest at the rate of thirteen 
percent per annum, 13% ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE. 
If any installment is not paid in full within ten days after 
its due date, a late charge may be assessed of $100.00 dollars, 
or at holder's election, an amount equal to the annual percentage 
rate stated above times the unpaid amount of the installment from 
the due date of the installment until paid in full. 
If default be made in 
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Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and 
extension of time without notice are hereby waived and the 
undersigned consents to the release of any security, or any part 
thereof, with or without substitution. 
DATED this J^g" day of September, 1987. 
WASATCH BOWLING, INC. 
UmmJjdL 
By:. 
T i t l e : 
Corporate Secretary 
— ~,7 
'/ 
--'-A 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY. OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
1987. 
day of September, 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing In: 
GUARANTY AGREEMENT 
In consideration and in order to induce Olympus Hills 
Shopping Center, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, to accept that 
certain Promissory Note Agreement dated September" /,;< , 1987, 
entered into by Wasatch Bowling, Inc., a Utah corporation, as a 
maker, (the "Note") a copy of said Note being attached hereto and 
made a part hereof, the undersigned Wesley F. Sine, an 
individual, does hereby unconditionally and absolutely guarantee 
the full, faithful and prompt performance, payment and discharge 
by the maker of all of the terms and obligations of said Note in 
accordance with the terrps thereof and, in the event of default by 
the maker in the payment of any amounts payable under said 
agreement, the undersigned, upon demand, immediately will pay the 
total outstanding unpaid principal balance plus any accrued 
interest and costs due under the terms of said agreement, without 
requiring any proceedings to be taken by Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center, Ltd., against the maker. 
The liability of the undersigned hereunder shall not be 
modified in any manner whatsoever by any extension that may be 
granted to the maker by any court or any proceedings under the 
Bankruptcy Act, or any amendments thereof, or under any state or 
federal statute. Undersigned expressly waives the benefits of 
any such extension. Undersigned agrees to pay all costs of 
collection including reasonable attorneys' fees, whether or not 
suit is actually filed. 
The undersigned shall provide to Olympus Hills a current 
financial statement at the time of executing this Guaranty and at 
the end of every nine (9) month period thereafter, in the event 
payment is not made as agreed or this Guaranty is extended or 
renewed. 
Undersigned hereby waives notice of the acceptance of this 
Guaranty and waives presentment, protest and demand and notice of 
protest and demand of said note. Olympus Hills Shopping Center, 
Ltd., may without the consent of undersigned__and without giving 
notice hereof to undersigned, compound, compromise and adjust its 
claim against the maker and grant extensions and other 
indulgences, to the maker without affecting the obligations of 
the undersigned hereunder. The obligations of undersigned shall 
be unconditional and unqualified and shall continue until the 
said note is fully paid, satisfied and discharged. This Guaranty 
shall not be discharged or affected by the death of the 
undersigned, but shall bind his heirs and personal 
representatives and shall inure to the benefit of the successors 
and assigns of Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. 
IN WITNESS WHEgEQJT, junders igned has he reun to s e t h i s hand 
t h i s / ^ % d a y of September, 1987. 
/ V
 / , >>, 'J (--^l o 
Wesley F. Siner, an i n d i v i d u a l 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of September, 
1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing In: 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
DEO 10 
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DEC 20 '68 08:26 CB CRES SLC UT. P.2 
A MEUtcfc 0 / tm. »CAM? riKAMCUi Mfrwuivt 
GOLDUIGLL 
June 20, 1988 
COLDwe^L 8ANKCA 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE SERVICES, 
• 4iv»«iOfi of Cc*G*«4l CUuikcf C&mmtrcui Gioup. inc. 
f *A<JT INTESTATE BUILDING 
170 SOUTH MAIM STHcET. SUT£ 1^00 
SALT L M E CITY UTAH *4t3\-:*CS 
Mr. Wesley Sine 
WASATCH BOWLING 
640 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
LETTER OF AGREEMENT 
Dear Mr- Sine: 
Pursuant to the letter dated 3/31/88 from David R. Kocherhans, Property Manager 
for Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services, pertaining to reduction in 
rent the following is what Richard Skankey has agreed to: * 
1) Monthly rent shall be reduced to $4,000.00 versus 10% of the «>wUy 
gross receipts whichever is greater beginning April 1, 1988. ^°^lG>bR 
2) Monthly rent shall include all CAM charges which are approximately 
$2,500,00 per month, 
3) Merchants dues will remain at $150.00 per month. 
4) Monthly payment on the Pianissory Note dated October 12, 1987 shall be 
reduced from $1,200.00 per month to 5580.00 per month, interest only. 
This agreement will extend for the period of two years to March 31, 1990 at the 
end of which time the regular lease payments will resume and at this time also 
the full amount of the Promissory Note will be due and payable. 
Richard Skankey / Date 
-0-37 
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JUN2 71989 
OF^OE OF JUDGE 
•3LCM i . CLARK 
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
SCOTT 0. MERCER (3834) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-9333 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH, 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
In re: 
WASATCH BOWLING, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Debtor, 
Debtor's Tax Identification 
No. 87 0257646 
Bankruptcy No. 89C 03881 
(Chapter 
ORDER 
The motion of Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Limited 
("Creditor") for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. §362(f) came on for hearing before the above entitled 
court on June 27, 1989 at the hour of 3:45 p.m. Creditor was 
represented by and through its counsel, Scott 0. Mercer of Kesler 
& Rust. Debtor appeared through Keith Henderson. Mr. Mercer 
discussed his efforts to notify counsel of the hearing as 
required by Rule 4001(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Rules. 
The court, having reviewed the verified motion for 
-1-
relief from the automatic stay, and having found on the sole 
basis that Creditor will suffer irreparable and immediate injury, 
loss or damage if it is unable to complete the ordered eviction 
of debtor from the leased premises and proceed to place its new 
proposed tenant in possession forthwith; and the court having 
found that such damage is irreparable in that Creditor has been 
unable to find any other suitable tenant for this unique 
property; and the court having found that adequate effort was 
made to notify counsel for the debtor; it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the automatic stay 
be and is hereby modified to allow Creditor to complete its state 
court action and executed writ of restitution restoring Creditor 
to possession of the leased premises located at 4015 South 
Wasatch Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DATED this ^ ^day of June, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
norable Jtidf^Glen E. Clark 
> nsrory 
to a :;U:; 
<;/ M .^t th? annexed ^r.o iongoing 
'A- ..-;:v:;n£ en 
^ 0 ' 
JBcbU - 2 -£/._A/a<u/-s 
Exhibit E 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In re 
WASATCH BOWLING, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Debtor. 
Bankruptcy Case No. 89C-03881 
O R D E R 
The matter presently and properly before the court is creditor Olympus Hills 
Shopping Center, Ltd.'s Motion to Require Debtor to Assume or Reject Lease, filed on 
July 6, 1989. The lease which is the subject of Olympus Hills' motion concerns 
premises known as the Wasatch Bowling Lanes, located at the Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center. A hearing was held on July 25, 1989. J. Keith Henderson appeared on behalf 
of Wasatch Bowling, Inc., the debtor in this Chapter 11 case. Scott 0. Mercer 
appeared on behalf of Olympus Hills, the landlord. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the court ordered counsel to brief within ten days the issue of whether the lease was 
in effect when the petition was filed in this case or had terminated prior to that time. 
Counsel have timely submitted memoranda on this issue, and the court has carefully 
considered and reviewed the arguments of counsel and all memoranda. The court has 
Page 2 
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also made an independent review of the pertinent authorities. Now being fully advised, 
the court finds and determines as follows: 
1. Judge Scott Daniels' Order of June 15, 1989, restoring the debtor to 
possession of the premises, was without prejudice to the rights of Olympus Hills. 
2. Prior to Judge Daniels' Order, Olympus Hills had evicted the debtor from 
the premises pursuant to the service of a writ of restitution. 
3. But for Judge Daniels' Order, the debtor would not have been in 
possession of the premises on the date of petition and would have had no right to 
possession. 
4. The prepetition eviction of the debtor pursuant to the writ of restitution 
terminated the lease, leaving nothing for the debtor to assume or assign on the petition 
date. 
5. Even if the lease had not terminated, debtor's possessory interest under 
the lease had terminated. Thus, the only portions of the lease that the debtor had a 
right to assume or assign on the date of petition were the burdens, e.g., payment of 
the lease obligation. 
6. It is unreasonable to allow the debtor to assume or assign the burdens 
of the lease without the corresponding benefit of possession. The lease is therefore 
deemed rejected. 
Accordingly, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that creditor Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., is 
granted relief from the stay to pursue its state-law remedies with respect to the 
premises known as the Wasatch Bowling Lanes. 
<? DATED this 6 day of August, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
GLEN E. CLARK, CHIEF JUDGE 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
Page 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Order to the 
following this y day of August, 1989. 
Scott 0. Mercer, Esq. 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Keith Henderson, Esq. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lawrence E. Corbridge, Esq. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Secretary to "Judge Clark/ 
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
IN RE ) 
WASATCH BOWLING, INC. 5 ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
) 
Bankruptcy No. 89C-03881 
) 
The above debtor(s) not having timely filed statement of 
affairs and schedules in the above case, it is new upon good cause, 
ORDERED, that the above case be and it is dismissed without 
prejudice. 
DATED: August 16, 1989 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
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JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
SCOTT 0. MERCER (3834) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-9333 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, : 
LIMITED, a Utah limited : AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREN B. HUNT 
partnership, : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
WASATCH BOWLING, INC., a Utah : CIVIL NO. C87-8427 
corporation, : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Lauren B. Hunt, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Property Manager of Coldwell Banker Real 
Estate Management Services. 
2. I am over the age of 21 years and have personal 
knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
3. Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services is the 
property manager for Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. I am 
personally familiar with the lease agreement between plaintiff 
-1-
and defendant in this action. 
4. I am personally familiar with all of the payments made 
by defendant under the said lease agreement and am personally 
familiar with the business records relating thereto. 
5. As of January 1, 1988, defendant was substantially past 
due in rental payments due under the lease agreement. 
6. From January 1, 1988 to the present, defendant has 
never brought the rental payments current. 
7. From January 1, 1988 to the present, no rental payment 
has been paid within ten (10) days of the due date. 
8. Defendant is currently past due in rental payments in 
the amount of $147,250.79. 
DATED thii£3^ J T day of January, 1989. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 
day of January, 1989 by Lauren B. Hunt, the Property 
-2-
Manager for Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this ?0 ^^day of January, 
1989. 
(Seal) 
Residing at 
My^Conariiss ion Empires: 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Lauren B. Hunt in 
Civil No. C-87-8427, postage prepaid, this ff/pW^day of January, 
1989, to: 
Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
i///ur cg^r^ 
1:afflauren.sine 
-3-
